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Let G = (V , E) be a graph and S ⊆ V . The set S is a secure set if ∀X ⊆ S, |N[X] ∩ S| ≥
|N[X]−S|, and S is a global secure set if S is a secure set and a dominating set. The cardinality
of a minimum global secure set of G is the global security number of G, denoted γs(G). The
sets studied in this paper are different from secure dominating sets studied in Cockayne et al.
(2003) [3], Grobler and Mynhardt (2009) [8], or Klostermeyer and Mynhardt (2008) [13],
which are also denoted by γs.
In this paper, we provide results on the global security numbers of paths, cycles and
their Cartesian products.
Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Let G = (V , E) be a graph. For x ∈ V ,NG(x) = {y : xy ∈ E} is the open neighborhood of x and NG[x] = NG(x) ∪ {x} is the
closed neighborhood of x. For S ⊆ V ,NG(S) = x∈S NG(x) and NG[S] = NG(S) ∪ S are the open and closed neighborhoods of
S in G, respectively. We omit the subscript G when the graph under consideration is clear. Notation not introduced in this
paper follows [15].
Consider a situation where every vertex y ∈ N[S]− S chooses a neighbor in N(y)∩ S to attack. Given such a choice for all
vertices in N[S] − S, every vertex x ∈ S may choose a vertex in N[x] ∩ S to defend. The attack is defended if, for every vertex
v ∈ S, the number of vertices attacking v is at most the number of vertices defending v, and S is a secure set if any given
attack can be defended. A formal definition can be found in [1]. While the formal definition is precise, it is cumbersome to
work with. Instead, the following characterization given in [1] serves as our working definition.
Theorem 1 ([1, Theorem 11]). A non-empty set S ⊆ V is secure if and only if ∀X ⊆ S, |N[X] ∩ S| ≥ |N[X] − S|.
The vertices in S are called defenders and the vertices in N[S] − S are called attackers. If S is not a secure set, then there
exists a witness set X ⊆ S such that |N[X] ∩ S| < |N[X] − S|.
The cardinality of a minimum secure set of G is the security number of G, denoted s(G). Previous work on secure sets and
security numbers can be found in [1,4–7,11,14]. The set S is a dominating set if N[S] = V . The reader may refer to [9,10] for a
review on dominating sets. Set S is a global secure set if S is a dominating set and a secure set. The cardinality of a minimum
global secure set of G is the global security number of G, denoted γs(G). Note that a global secure set is different from a secure
dominating set, studied in [3,8,13].
Set S is a total dominating set if S is a dominating set and the subgraph of G induced by S contains no isolated vertex. The
cardinality of a minimum total dominating set of G is denoted γo(G), following the notation of [2].
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Fig. 1. Enumeration of attacker groups.
The Cartesian product of two graphs G and H is a graph denoted G × H , where V (G × H) = V (G) × V (H) and
E(G × H) = {(vi, ui)(vj, uj) : (vi = vj and uiuj ∈ E(H)) or (vivj ∈ E(G) and ui = uj)}. The class of graphs which contains
exactly Pn, Cn, Pn × Pm, Pn × Cm and Cn × Cm is the class of grid-like graphs.
A lower bound on the global security number of an arbitrary graph may be obtained using Theorem 1.
Lemma 2. Let G = (V , E) be a graph. Then, γs(G) ≥ |V |/2.
Proof. Let S be a minimum global secure set of G. Since S is a dominating set, N[S] = V and |S| + |N[S] − S| = |V |. Since S
is a secure set, by Theorem 1, |S| ≥ |N[S] − S| = |V | − |S|. So, 2|S| ≥ |V | and |S| ≥ |V |/2. 
The following result is proven in [12].
Theorem 3 ([12]). Let G = (V , E) be a grid-like graph. When G is isomorphic to C4k+2, C3 × C4k+2 or C7 × C4k+2, |V |/2 ≤
γs(G) ≤ |V |/2+ 1. In all other cases, γs(G) = ⌈|V |/2⌉.
In [12], upper bounds on the global security numbers of grid-like graphs were established by exhibiting global secure
sets for these graphs. For graph G, an upper bound of ⌈|V (G)|/2⌉, along with Lemma 2, implies γs(G) = ⌈|V (G)|/2⌉. This is
the case for all grid-like graphs, with the exceptions stated in Theorem 3. In this paper, we show that γs(C4k+2) = 2k+ 2 =
|V |/2+ 1, γs(C3 × C4k+2) = 6k+ 4 = |V |/2+ 1 and γs(C7 × C4k+2) = 14k+ 7 = |V |/2.
2. Global secure sets of C4k+2
Theorem 4. γs(C4k+2) = 2k+ 2 for k ≥ 1.
Proof. Let G = C4k+2. By Theorem 3, 2k+1 ≤ γs(G) ≤ 2k+2. Let S be aminimumglobal secure set of G. Since G is 2-regular,
every vertex in S must have another neighbor in S, so S is a total dominating set of G. Then, γs(G) ≥ γo(G). In [2, p. 367–369],
it was shown that γo(C4k+2) = 2k+ 2. 
3. Global secure sets of C3 × C4k+2
Let S be a global secure set of C3 × C4k+2. Consider C3 × C4k+2 as an array with 3 rows and 4k+ 2 columns. A column is
an attacker column if it contains at most one vertex in S, otherwise it is a defender column. An attacker group is a maximal
consecutive sequence of attacker columns. A defender group is a maximal consecutive sequence of defender columns. The
groups are taken cyclically around the leftmost and rightmost columns. So, if the leftmost and rightmost columns are both
attacker (defender) columns, the two columns belong to the same group. Notice if |S| = 6k + 3, then there is at least one
attacker group and at least one defender group, in which case the number of attacker groups is equal to the number of
defender groups.
Fig. 1 enumerates the possible non-isomorphic attacker groups in a C3 × C4k+2. In Fig. 1 and subsequent figures (where
applicable), each configuration corresponds to a partial projection of a global secure set of the entire graph, where the
vertices in the set are marked in black. The enumeration process terminates when the configuration is either not secure,
or not dominating, in which case either a witness or an undominated vertex is boxed in the figure. The enumeration is
exhaustive, with rotations and reflections of the same configuration omitted. Then, the only possible attacker groups of
C3 × C4k+2 are shown in Fig. 2, along with isomorphic (under vertical rotation) configurations. Thus, any attacker group of
C3 × C4k+2 consists of either one or two columns.
We will refer to attacker groups in Fig. 2 as attacker groups type I through IV, without explicit reference to Fig. 2
repetitively. A column is empty if it contains no vertex in S. An attacker group may contain one or two consecutive empty
columns, corresponding to attacker group types I and II respectively. We now proceed by case analysis based on the number
of attacker groups of type II in C3 × C4k+2.
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Fig. 2. All non-isomorphic attacker groups in C3 × C4k+2 .
Lemma 5. Suppose S is a global secure set of cardinality 6k+ 3 for C3 × C4k+2, such that C3 × C4k+2 does not contain attacker
groups of type II. If A is an attacker group and D is a defender group immediately adjacent to A (either to its left or right), then
the only possible configurations of A∪ D, with isomorphic (under reflection and rotation) images omitted, are shown in Fig. 4 (a)
and (b).
Proof. Only three different types of attacker groups exist in C3× C4k+2 as seen from Fig. 2. With reference to Fig. 3, we start
with each attacker group and enumerate, to its right, the possible configurations of S in C3×C4k+2. The column immediately
after each group must be a defender column, because an attacker group is maximal. The column after this defender column
maybe of any type. Let abe thenumber of attackers and dbe thenumber of defenders in each configuration. The enumeration
terminates either when the configuration is not secure (with witnesses boxed), or when a ≤ d. We have established that
a ≤ d in each A ∪ D. Note that enumerations to the left of each attacker group are reflections of those shown in Fig. 3.
Let A1,D1, . . . , At ,Dt be the attacker and defender groups of C3 × C4k+2. Let ai and di be the number of attackers and
defenders in Ai ∪ Di, respectively. The above paragraph establishes ai ≤ di. But∑ti=1 ai = ∑ti=1 di = 6k + 3, so ai = di
for 1 ≤ i ≤ t . Similarly, if we consider Ai ∪ Di−1, with indexes wrapping around over {1, 2, . . . , t}, the number of attackers
must equal the number of defenders in Ai ∪ Di−1.
Since the number of attackers equals the number of defenders in each Ai∪Di and Ai∪Di−1, the enumerations terminating
with fewer attackers than defenders (a < d) in Fig. 3 are invalid and cannot appear under the given assumptions. As a result,
the possible configurations of Ai∪Di (or Ai∪Di−1), with isomorphic images omitted, are those in Fig. 4(a) (or 4(b)). Note that,
although enumerations in Fig. 3 might not be sure to have included all columns of a defender group (because it terminated
whenever a ≤ d), the configurations shown in Fig. 4(a) and (b) include all columns of the defender group, since any additional
defender columnwill make the number of defenders in Ai ∪Di (or Ai ∪Di−1) strictly more than the number of attackers, and
would be invalid. 
Lemma 6 and Corollary 7 will be used in the proof of Lemma 8, to show that |S| > 6k + 3 when S contains no attacker
groups of type II.
Lemma 6. Let G be a graph and S be a global secure set of G such that |V (G)| = 2|S|. Then, for allw ∈ S, there exists u ∉ S such
that (N(u) ∩ S) ⊆ (N[w] ∩ S).
Proof. Suppose not. Letw ∈ S be such that for all ui ∉ S, (N(ui)∩S) ⊈ (N[w]∩S), where V (G)−S = {u1, u2, . . . , uk} is the
set of attackers. Every vertex ui ∈ V (G)− S has a neighbor u′i ∈ (N(ui)∩ S)− (N[w] ∩ S). In particular, u′i ∈ S is a neighbor
of ui, but notw. Consider X = {u′i : 1 ≤ i ≤ k}. Sincew ∉ (N[X]∩ S), |N[X]∩ S| ≤ |S|−1 < |S| = |V (G)− S| = |N[X]− S|,
a contradiction to S being a secure set. 
Corollary 7. Let G be a graph and S ⊆ V (G) be a dominating set of G such that |V (G)| = 2|S|. If there exists w ∈ S such that
for all u ∉ S, (N(u) ∩ S)− (N[w] ∩ S) ≠ ∅, then S is not secure.
Lemma 8. Let S be a global secure set of C3 × C4k+2 with no attacker groups of type II. Then, |S| > 6k+ 3.
Proof. Assume |S| = 6k+3. By Lemma 5, if A is an attacker group and D is a defender group adjacent to A, then Fig. 4(a) and
(b) present all non-isomorphic configurations of A ∪ D. Recall that attacker and defender groups are maximal with respect
to the number of consecutive attacker and defender columns they contain. Then, pattern (i) in Fig. 4(a) and (b) cannot exist
in S because the single column defender group would be next to an empty column and another attacker column, in which
case the vertices in the defender group form a witness set.
The remaining three possible configurations have different numbers of defender columns in their defender groups, and
different numbers of defenders in their attacker groups. We claim that configuration S is composed of repeated patterns of
exactly one type of A ∪ D groups. For example, if S contains adjacent attacker/defender groups that are instances of pattern
(iii) of Fig. 4(a) (or 4(b)), then all adjacent attacker/defender groups of S are instances of pattern (iii) of Fig. 4(a) (or 4(b)), with
possible vertical reflection and rotation applied to different instances. To justify this, let A1,D1, . . . , At ,Dt be the attacker
and defender groups of S. Without lost of generality, suppose A1 ∪ D1 forms pattern (iii) in Fig. 4(a). This implies D1 must
consist of exactly three columns. Then, in D1 ∪ A2, the only valid choice from Fig. 4(b) is pattern (iii) because it is the only
pattern where the defender group consists of exactly three columns. In turn, this implies A2 must consist of a single empty
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Fig. 3. Enumerations of attacker group A followed by parts of defender group D. Symbols a and d denote the number of attackers and defenders in A ∪ D,
respectively. The attacker groups which start each enumeration are of types I, III and IV.
Fig. 4. Possible attacker group with adjacent defender group to its right (a) and to its left (b), assuming the global secure set does not contain attacker
groups of type II. See the proof of Lemma 5 for details.
column. Now consider A2∪D2. Patterns (i) and (iii) in Fig. 4(a) have attacker groups consisting of exactly one empty column,
but we established in the previous paragraph that (i) cannot occur. Thus, the only valid pattern for A2 ∪D2 is (iii) of Fig. 4(a).
Similar arguments hold for the remaining groups.
Next, we claim that pattern (iii) and (iv) of Fig. 4(a) (or 4(b)) cannot occur in S. If there is a pattern of type (iii) (or (iv)),
by the argument in the previous paragraph the entire configuration must consist of only patterns of type (iii) (or (iv)). But,
since pattern (iii) (or (iv)) has 4 columns, the total number of columns of C3×C4k+2 must be amultiple of 4, an impossibility.
Finally, we show that it is also impossible for S to be composed of only instances of pattern type (ii) in Fig. 4(a) (or 4(b)).
Fig. 5 enumerates the possible configurations of S that consist of only instances of type (ii) patterns, with possible vertical
reflection and rotation applied to different instances. In the enumeration, the columns must alternate between a column
with exactly one vertex in S and a column with exactly two vertices in S. Note that, if a vertex v ∈ S has two neighbors
outside S, then the other two neighbors of v must be in S, for otherwise {v} is a witness. Situations like this are noted by an
arrow pointing from v to the neighbor of v that must be included in S. If a configuration is not secure, then either a witness
is boxed, or a vertex w ∈ S is labeled, where for all u ∉ S, (N(u) ∩ S) − (N[w] ∩ S) ≠ ∅ (Corollary 7). Fig. 5 shows that
there are no secure set configurations for C3 × C4k+2 when the configuration consists of only instances of type (ii) patterns
in Fig. 4(a) and (b). 
Lemma 9 will be used in the proof of Lemma 10, to show that |S| > 6k + 3 if S contains exactly one attacker group of
type II.
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Fig. 5. Enumeration of global secure set of C3×C4k+2 , assuming the set is composed solely of type (ii) patterns in Fig. 4(a) and (b). See the proof of Lemma 8
for details.
Lemma 9. Assume S is a global secure set of cardinality 6k + 3 for C3 × C4k+2. If exactly one attacker group is of type II, then
there is no attacker group of type I.
Proof. Suppose not. Let c1, c2, . . . , c4k+2 be the columns of C3 × C4k+2. Without lost of generality, label the two adjacent
empty columns c1 and c4k+2. Then, c1 and c4k+2 form an attacker group of type II. In order to dominate vertices of c1 and
c4k+2, all vertices of c2 and c4k+1 are in S. Let ci be another empty columnwhere 2 < i < 4k+1. Column ci forms an attacker
group of type I. Since attacker groups are maximal, ci−1 and ci+1 are defender columns, so each contains at least two vertices
in S.
Let a and d be the number of attackers and defenders in C3 × C4k+2, respectively. Let V1 = c2 ∪ c3 ∪ · · · ∪ ci−1 and
V2 = ci+1 ∪ · · · ∪ c4k+1. Let aj and dj be the number of attackers and defenders in Vj, respectively, for j ∈ {1, 2}. With this
notation, a = d = 6k+ 3, a = a1 + a2 + 9 and d = d1 + d2.
Let X1 = (V1∩S) and X2 = (V2∩S). Note that vertices in V1 are not adjacent to vertices of V2. So, (N[X1]∩S) = X1 and X1
dominates V1. Among vertices in N[X1] − S, there are a1 attackers in V1, three attackers in c1 and at least two attackers in ci
(because ci−1 is a defender column). Thus, |N[X1]−S| ≥ a1+5. Since S is a secure set, |X1| = |N[X1]∩S| ≥ |N[X1]−S| ≥ a1+5.
Similarly, |X2| ≥ a2 + 5. Then, d = d1 + d2 = |X1| + |X2| ≥ a1 + a2 + 10 = a+ 1, which is impossible since d = a. 
Lemma 10. Let S be a global secure set of C3 × C4k+2. If exactly one attacker group of S is of type II, then |S| > 6k+ 3.
Proof. Assume |S| = 6k + 3. By Lemma 9, there is no attacker group of type I in S. Let c1, c2, . . . , c4k+2 be the columns of
C3 × C4k+2. Without lost of generality, label the two adjacent empty columns c1 and c4k+2. Columns c1 and c4k+2 form an
attacker group of type II. In order to dominate vertices of c1 and c4k+2, all vertices in c2 and c4k+1 must be in S.
Let X = c3 ∪ c4 ∪ · · · ∪ c4k and let a and d denote the number of attackers and defenders in X . Notice a = d = 6k− 3. Let
di be the number of columns with i defenders, among the columns of X , for 0 ≤ i ≤ 3. Since X contains no empty columns,
d0 = 0. With this notation, d0 + d1 = d1 is the number of attacker columns among columns of X and d2 + d3 is the number
of defender columns of X . Furthermore, a = 3d0+2d1+d2 = 2d1+d2 and d = d1+2d2+3d3. Since a = d, d1 = d2+3d3.
Let A1,D1, . . . , At ,Dt be attacker and defender groups of S. More specifically, let A1 be the attacker group c1 ∪ c4k+2,D1
be the defender group which contains c2, A2 be the attacker group to the right (increase in column number) of D1,D2 the
defender group to the right of A2, and so on. Note that all attacker groups, with the exception of A1, must be of type III or IV.
With this notation, Dt contains column c4k+1.
We claim that t ≥ 2. If t = 1, then A1 is the only attacker group in S. But columns of A1 are c1 and c4k+2, which are not
included in X . Thus, X contains only defender columns, or d1 = 0. But d1 = d2 + 3d3, so d2 = d3 = 0, which is impossible
since X contains at least two columns.
The columns in A2 ∪ D2 ∪ A3 ∪ D3 ∪ · · · ∪ At−1 ∪ Dt−1 ∪ At are a subset of X . X does not contain any column of A1, and
may contain some, but not all, of the columns of D1 and Dt . Let |Aj| and |Dj| denote the number of columns of Aj and Dj,
respectively. Let pi,j be the number of columns with exactly i defenders in Aj ∪Dj, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 3 and 2 ≤ j ≤ t− 1. Note that
p0,j = 0, |Aj| = p1,j and |Dj| = p2,j + p3,j for 2 ≤ j ≤ t − 1.
With reference to Fig. 3, consider enumerations that start with attacker groups of type III or IV. The valid partial
configurations that are also terminal configurations are shown in Fig. 6. These are valid partial configurations of Aj ∪ Dj
for 2 ≤ j ≤ t−1. Each partial configuration shows the entire attacker group, but may show only part of the defender group.
By examining each configuration, we may establish
p1,j ≤ p2,j + 2p3,j for 2 ≤ j ≤ t − 1. (1)
Notice c3 must be a defender column, for otherwise vertices in c2 form awitness. Similarly, c4k must be a defender column.
Then, c3 ∈ D1 and c4k ∈ Dt . There are d2+ d3 defender columns in X , specifically {c3, c4k} ⊆ X and D2 ∪D3 ∪ · · · ∪Dt−1 ⊆ X
are defender columns. Then,
d2 + d3 ≥ 2+
t−1
j=2
(p2,j + p3,j). (2)
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Fig. 6. Valid partial configurations for A ∪ D, if A is of type III or IV.
(a) Possible configurations for
Aj ∪ Dj, 2 ≤ j ≤ t − 1. These
configurations are not partial.
(b) Possible partial configurations for
Dj ∪ Aj+1, 2 ≤ j ≤ t − 1.
Fig. 7. See the proof of Lemma 10 for details.
Note that strict inequality in (2) may be possible, since d2 + d3 may contain other defender columns of D1 and Dt , which
are not accounted for on the right hand side. Now, consider attacker columns of X . Since t ≥ 2 and |At | ≤ 2, inequalities
(1) and (2) give
d1 =
t−
j=2
|Aj| = |At | +
t−1
j=2
|Aj| ≤ 2+
t−1
j=2
|Aj| ≤ 2+
t−1
j=2
(p2,j + 2p3,j)
≤ 2+ d3 +
t−1
j=2
(p2,j + p3,j) ≤ d2 + 2d3. (3)
Then, by Eq. (3) and d1 = d2 + 3d3, we get d3 = 0 and d1 = d2. Among columns of X , there are exactly d1 attacker
columns, each containing exactly one defender, and exactly d2 defender columns, each containing exactly two defenders.
Since d1 = d2, d3 = p3,j = 0 and |Aj| = p1,j, the inequalities in (3) are equalities. Thus, |At | = 2,∑t−1j=2 p1,j =∑t−1j=2 p2,j and
d2 = 2+
∑t−1
j=2 p2,j

= 2+
∑t−1
j=2 |Dj|

.
The d2 defender columns of X are composed of columns in D2 ∪ D3 ∪ · · · ∪ Dt−1, as well as some (but not all) columns
from D1 and Dt , such as c3 and c4k. The equality d2 = 2+
∑t−1
j=2 |Dj|

indicates that exactly two defender columns, c3 and
c4k, are in X − (D2 ∪ D3 ∪ · · · ∪ Dt−1), so |D1| = |Dt | = 2.
Since d3 = p3,j = 0, inequality (1) becomes p1,j ≤ p2,j for 2 ≤ j ≤ t − 1. But,∑t−1j=2 p1,j = ∑t−1j=2 p2,j, so p1,j = p2,j, and|Aj| = |Dj|, for 2 ≤ j ≤ t − 1.
Recall that Fig. 6 shows valid partial configurations of a given attacker group in X and the adjacent defender group to its
right. Since p3,j = 0, patterns (iii), (iv) and (vi) must not appear in X . In addition, since |Aj| = |Dj|, patterns (i), (ii) and (v)
are no longer partial configurations, because any additional defender columns for the defender groups will make p1,j < p2,j.
Then, possible patterns for Aj ∪ Dj, 2 ≤ j ≤ t − 1 are shown in Fig. 7(a).
Next, consider Dj ∪Aj+1 for 2 ≤ j ≤ t−1. Note that Dj ∪Aj+1 are columns in X , and Aj+1 is an attacker group of type III or
IV. Enumerations of possible defender groups to the left of Aj+1 are exact reflections of those shown in Fig. 3. Since d3 = 0,
the only possible partial patterns for Dj ∪ Aj+1 are shown in Fig. 7(b). These patterns are partial because they contain the
entire attacker group, but may contain only part of the defender group. Nonetheless, |Dj| ≥ |Aj+1| for 2 ≤ j ≤ t − 1.
Notice from Fig. 2 that |A2| ≤ 2. Since |Aj| = |Dj|, |Dj| ≥ |Aj+1| and |At | = 2, 2 ≥ |A2| = |D2| ≥ |A3| = |D3| ≥ · · · ≥
|At−1| = |Dt−1| ≥ |At | = 2. Along with |A1| = 2 and |D1| = |Dt | = 2, |Aj| = |Dj| = 2 for 1 ≤ j ≤ t . This implies
4k+ 2 =∑tj=1(|Aj| + |Dj|) = 4t , which is not possible. 
Theorem 11. γs(C3 × C4k+2) = 6k+ 4 for k ≥ 1.
Proof. By Theorem 3, 6k+3 ≤ γs(C3×C4k+2) ≤ 6k+4.We prove γs(C3×C4k+2) > 6k+3 by induction on the value of k. For
k = 1, let S ′ be aminimumglobal secure set of C3×C6. If there is atmost one attacker group of type II in C3×C6, by Lemmas 8
and 10, |S ′| > 9. Otherwise, there are at least two attacker groups of type II in C3 × C6, but then |V (C3 × C6)− S ′| ≥ 12 and
|S ′| ≤ 6, an impossibility.
Assume γs(C3× C4k′+2) > 6k′+ 3 for 1 ≤ k′ < k. Then, let S be a minimum global secure set of C3× C4k+2. By Lemmas 8
and 10, if there is at most one attacker group of type II, then |S| > 6k+ 3.
Consider the remaining case where S contains at least two attacker groups of type II. Let c1, c2, . . . , c4k+2 be columns
of C3 × C4k+2. More specifically, let c1, ci, ci+1, c4k+2 be empty columns. Columns {c1, c4k+2} and {ci, ci+1} form two attacker
groups of type II. Note that 2 < i < i + 1 < 4k + 1. Let X1 = c1 ∪ c2 ∪ · · · ∪ ci and X2 = ci+1 ∪ · · · ∪ c4k+2. Let aj and dj,
respectively, be the number of attackers and defenders in Xj, for j ∈ {1, 2}.
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(a) C7 × P6 . (b) C7 × P4 . (c) A global secure set of C7 × C4k+2 as constructed by the proof of
Theorem 13.
Fig. 8. Global secure sets configurations of C7 × P6, C7 × P4 and C7 × C4k+2 .
Because c1, ci, ci+1 and c4k+2 are empty columns, every attacker in X1 must be dominated by a defender in X1 ∩ S, and
may attack a vertex in X1 ∩ S. Since S is secure, a1 ≤ d1. Then, X1 ∩ S is a global secure set of C3 × Ci. Similarly, a2 ≤ d2 and
X2 ∩ S is a global secure set of C3 × C4k+2−i.
Assume |S| = 6k + 3. Then, a1 + a2 = d1 + d2. Since a1 ≤ d1 and a2 ≤ d2, it follows that a1 = d1 and a2 = d2.
The number of vertices in X1 is 3i = a1 + d1 = 2d1. So, i, and thus 4k + 2 − i are even. Then, either i ≡ 2(mod 4) or
(4k+ 2− i) ≡ 2(mod 4). So, either X1 ∩ S or X2 ∩ S is a counter example to the inductive hypothesis. Thus, the assumption
|S| = 6k+ 3 is false and |S| > 6k+ 3. 
4. Global secure sets of C7 × C4k+2
Observation 12. Let G = (V , E) be a graph and S be a secure set of G. For x, y ∈ V , if x, y ∈ S or x, y ∉ S, then S is a secure
set of G′ = (V , E ∪ {xy}).
Theorem 13. γs(C7 × C4k+2) = 14k+ 7 for k ≥ 1.
Proof. By Theorem 3, 14k+ 7 ≤ γs(C7 × C4k+2) ≤ 14k+ 8. We show that γs(C7 × C4k+2) ≤ 14k+ 7 by exhibiting a global
secure set of cardinality 14k+7 for C7×C4k+2. The construction technique follows those in [12]. Fig. 8(a) and (b) show global
secure set configurations for C7 × P6 and C7 × P4 respectively. The validity of these configurations has been checked by a
computer program. Consider the disjoint union of one copy of the global secure set configuration of C7× P6 and k−1 copies
of the global secure set configuration of C7 × P4. The leftmost and rightmost columns of each of these configurations are
identical. By Observation 12, adding edges between corresponding vertices on these columns results in a global secure set
of C7 × C4k+2. The cardinality of this set is 21+ 14(k− 1) = 14k+ 7. Fig. 8(c) illustrates the result of this construction. 
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have shown γs(C4k+2) = 2k + 2, γs(C3 × C4k+2) = 6k + 4 and γs(C7 × C4k+2) = 14k + 7. The global
security number of any grid-like graph is known.
Theorem 14. Let G = (V , E) be a grid-like graph. Then, γs(G) = ⌈|V |/2⌉, unless G is isomorphic to C4k+2 or C3 × C4k+2, in
which case γs(G) = |V |/2+ 1.
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